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The periaqueductal gray (PAG) is a small midbrain structure that surrounds the cerebral aqueduct, regulates brain–body communication, and is often studied for its role in “fight-or-flight” and “freezing” responses to threat. We used ultra-high field 7-Tesla fMRI to resolve the PAG in humans and distinguish it from the cerebral aqueduct, examining its in vivo function in humans during a working memory task (N = 87). Both mild and moderate cognitive demand elicited spatially similar patterns of whole brain BOLD response, and moderate cognitive demand elicited widespread BOLD increases above baseline in the brainstem. Notably, these brainstem increases were not significantly greater than those in the mild demand condition, suggesting that a subthreshold brainstem BOLD increase occurred for mild cognitive demand as well. PAG response was group-aligned and examined with subject-specific masks. In PAG, both mild and moderate demand elicited a well-defined response in ventrolateral PAG (vlPAG), a region thought to be functionally related to anticipated painful threat in humans and non-human animals—yet, the present task posed only the most minimal (if any) “threat”, with the cognitive tasks used being approximately equivalent to remembering a phone number. These findings suggest that the PAG may play a more general role in visceromotor regulation, even in the absence of threat.

Significance statementThe periaqueductal gray (PAG) is thought to control survival-related behavior, and is typically studied using experiments that manipulate threat. Others have proposed that the PAG plays a more general role in bodily regulation, but studies examining PAG function outside of threat-based experimental contexts are rare. We used high-resolution fMRI to examine PAG response in humans during a working memory task, which involves minimal threat. Moderate cognitive demands elicited a well-defined response in ventrolateral PAG, a functional subregion thought to coordinate a “freezing” response to threat. A task where threat is minimal elicited a clear fMRI response in one of the most well-known survival circuits in the brain, which suggests the PAG supports a more general function in brain­–body coordination.

Traditionally, lust and pride have been considered pleasurable, yet sinful in the West. Conversely, guilt is often considered aversive, yet valuable. These emotions illustrate how evaluations about specific emotions and beliefs about their hedonic properties may often diverge. Evaluations about specific emotions may shape important aspects of emotional life (e.g. in emotion regulation, emotion experience and acquisition of emotion concepts). Yet these evaluations are often understudied in affective neuroscience. Prior work in emotion regulation, affective experience, evaluation/attitudes and decision-making point to anterior prefrontal areas as candidates for supporting evaluative emotion knowledge. Thus, we examined the brain areas associated with evaluative and hedonic emotion knowledge, with a focus on the anterior prefrontal cortex. Participants (N = 25) made evaluative and hedonic ratings about emotion knowledge during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We found that greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) and precuneus was associated with an evaluative (vs hedonic) focus on emotion knowledge. Our results suggest that the mPFC and vmPFC, in particular, may play a role in evaluating discrete emotions.

Degeneracy in biological systems refers to a many-to-one mapping between physical structures and their functional (including psychological) outcomes. Despite the ubiquity of the phenomenon, traditional analytical tools for modeling degeneracy in neuroscience are extremely limited. In this study, we generated synthetic datasets to describe three situations of degeneracy in fMRI data to demonstrate the limitations of the current univariate approach. We describe a novel computational approach for the analysis referred to as neural topographic factor analysis (NTFA). NTFA is designed to capture variations in neural activity across task conditions and participants. The advantage of this discovery-oriented approach is to reveal whether and how experimental trials and participants cluster into task conditions and participant groups. We applied NTFA on simulated data, revealing the appropriate degeneracy assumption in all three situations and demonstrating NTFA’s utility in uncovering degeneracy. Lastly, we discussed the importance of testing degeneracy in fMRI data and the implications of applying NTFA to do so.

Friends and therapists often encourage people in distress to say how they feel (i.e., name their emotions) with the hope that identifying their emotions will help them cope. Although lay and some psychological theories posit that emotion naming should facilitate subsequent emotion regulation, there is little research directly testing this question. Here, we report on two experimental studies that test how naming the emotions evoked by aversive images impacts subsequent regulation of those emotions. In study 1 (N= 80), participants were randomly assigned into one of four between-subjects conditions in which they either (i) passively observed aversive images, (ii) named the emotions that these images made them feel, (iii) regulated their emotions by reappraising the meaning of images, or (iv) both named and regulated their emotions. Analyses of self-reported negative affect revealed that emotion naming impeded emotion regulation via reappraisal. Participants who named their emotions before reappraising reported feelingworsethan those who regulated without naming. Study 2 (N= 60) replicated these findings in a within-participants design, demonstrated that emotion naming also impeded regulation via mindful acceptance, and showed that observed effects were unrelated to a measure of social desirability, thereby mitigating the concern of experimenter demand. Together, these studies show that the impact of emotion naming on emotion regulation opposes common intuitions: instead of facilitating emotion regulation via reappraisal or acceptance, constructing an instance of a specific emotion category by giving it a name may “crystalize” one’s affective experience and make it more resistant to modification.